Occasional Paper No. 11: the crisis in South Serbia by Janjic, Dusan
 The crisis in South Serbia, or crisis in the Preševo valley, is directly linked to the problems of the Albanian community and their human and minority rights on
the one hand and border control on the other. At the same time, it includes ethnic conflict between Albanians (who are a minority in Serbia, but constitute a
dominant majority in the Preševo valley) and Serbs (who are a minority in the local community, but represent the central government since they are part of
the ethnic majority in Serbia). On top of everything, the complexity of this crisis is influenced by its linkages to the crises in Macedonia and Kosovo. The
Preševo valley consists of the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medjvedja, which are situated on Serbia’s borders with Macedonia and Kosovo. The
main roads and railways, which link Europe with Macedonia and Greece through Serbia, go through this valley. There are 120,000 inhabitants in the area,
out of which 70,000 are Albanians. Albanians frequently call this area "East Kosovo" or Dukadjin, thus showing their ethno-nationalistic claims over this
territory, which they see as a "part of the union of Albanian states." On their end, in the absence of perseverance in accomplishing their political goals and in
an attempt to focus attention on ideological aspects and to respond in like fashion to Albanian ethno-nationalism, authorities in Belgrade insist on calling the
area the "southern part of Central Serbia."
At the beginning of 2000, Albanian extremists tried to carry military actions from Kosovo over to South and Central Serbia. For this purpose, they wanted to
use the security vacuum that occurred after NATO bombing and after the withdrawal of Belgrade’s military and police forces from Kosovo. It is a fact that
both Milošević’s government and NATO, each one for its own reasons, tolerated the strengthening of these Albanian forces.
The new Government established by the winning coalition of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) accepted a programmeme for peaceful resolution
of the crisis and announced the undertaking of counterterrorism measures in January 2001. At the same time and for this purpose, the Government
established close cooperation with NATO, i.e., their troops in Kosovo, KFOR, the EU and the USA joined the cooperation in which the active role was given
to the OSCE and the UN.
The implementation of the Government of Serbia’s programmeme for the peaceful resolution of the crisis resulted in a number of good results, while at the
same time, politically, it was a very delicate and vulnerable process. According to the programmeme of the DOS government, accepted in January 2001, the
following results were accomplished:
A ceasefire was achieved in November 2001 and the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medjvedja was disarmed.
The entire region was demilitarized through withdrawal of the military and police forces.
Internal security was improved and freedom of movement was established. Establishing a local multiethnic police force was an important part of this
process, in which the OSCE was especially active.
Humanitarian aid was provided in food, medicines, cleaning supplies, etc., to 6,110 citizens of Albanian nationality. The payments for damages were
handed out in the amount of 920,000 euros and the Government of Serbia invested 1,000,000 euros in the reconstruction of damaged houses and for
the temporary accommodations of displaced persons.
The international community, especially the American administration, provided strong financial support for building infrastructure (roads, schools,
health institutions, media, etc). The Government of Serbia invested 8,317,000 euros for the same purpose.
Initial measures for including Albanians in political decision making in local government were undertaken. This process was strengthened when the
local election happened on July 28, 2002. In essence, this election was carried out in accordance to OSCE standards. Most of the seats in the local
government were taken by Albanians in Preševo, as well as for the first time in Bujanovac, and by Serbs in Medvedja.
This was also apparent during the local election. This election, namely, was intended to bring Serbian authority to the local communities. The election
results, however, were different. Since local Serbs did not want to share power with the Albanians, they organized numerous protests in which they refused
to accept the election results. It was expected having in mind the fact that the politicians from the ruling parties of Milošević’s regime joined the parties of
DOS after October 5th, 2000, thus continuing the old policy of denying the rights of Albanians. In addition to this, the inheritance of fifty years of communist
policy and twelve years of Milošević’s policy of favoring Serbs was still influencing the situation. For Albanians, who for the first time became the majority
within the electoral body of Bujanovac, this place has become a central point of political self-determination, as well as the central point of conflict with Serbs.
This question gains in weight especially because of the fact that there are thoughts on both sides of dividing along ethnic lines and exchanging territories.
According to such ideas, this territory would be exchanged for a part of North Kosovo. The situation is further complicated by the fact that political instability
is caused by the criminalization of the life, economy and politics in this area, which makes it a source of security risks and threats.
At the beginning of January 2005, after the Serbian-Montenegro border guards had killed a sixteen-year-old Albanian, who was crossing the border illegally,
ethnic tensions emerged again in South Serbia. About twenty thousand Albanians attended the funeral ceremony. A hundred Albanians broke into the
Preševo Town Hall and interrupted the city parliament session at which their representatives had already started demanding the withdrawal of Serbian
military forces and the bringing in of ‘foreign troops’, punishment of the responsible persons and a ‘diplomatic’ resolution of the Albanian issue in the entire
Preševo valley. The investigation that followed confirmed that the border guard from the Serbia-Montenegro armed forces shot at Dasnim Hajrulahu from an
observation point that was about 200m away. The Minister of Defence, Prvoslav Davinic, stated that the ‘border guard acted within the rules of
engagement.’ This angered the Albanians further and encouraged them to demand again the demilitarization of this region and its merger with Kosovo.
The latest crisis confirmed that the Preševo valley is an extremely unstable part of Serbia, that the Governments of Serbia and Serbia-Montenegro are not
sufficiently ready to react adequately and in a timely fashion, whereas the Albanian extremists are very much ready to utilize every single incident for their
own political goals. It is certain that this killing deepened the gap between Belgrade and Albanians from South Serbia and that it revived the fear of
resurgent violence between Albanian separatists and Serbian security forces. Because of all of this, the possibility of the escalation of violence in South
Serbia remains open. After all, as we know, this region has already been the place of conflict between Albanian guerrillas (Liberation Army of Preševo,
Bujanovac and Medvedja) and Serbian security forces from November 2000 to May 2001 when the ceasefire was reached. At that time, the local population
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Bujanovac and Medvedja) and Serbian security forces from November 2000 to May 2001 when the ceasefire was reached. At that time, the local population
received guarantees that their human rights would be respected and that they would be represented in the local government and police. At the same time, it
was announced that broader power would be granted to the local government and that the growth of local industry would be supported.
To make it worse, this is an impoverished region with a gross domestic product 52% smaller than on the state level, which puts it in last place in Serbia in
terms of economic development. After decades of industrial growth, a constant decline is currently noted because, in the meantime, parts of or entire big
companies (like "Yumko", "Simpo", "Koštana"), as well as many family businesses, closed down. One of the consequences is, therefore, increased levels of
emigration of the population from this region. According to last year’s data, more than thirty thousand people (out of a total of 460,000) moved out of this
region over a ten-year period. It is believed, however, that the actual number is twice as much because the official census data include some of the people
who have lived abroad for many years.
Local politicians believe that this accelerated emigration can be stopped by opening new companies, building new apartments for young people, and by
channelling investment capital towards South Serbia. However, as it is now, the chances of fulfilling these wishes are low since the officials of the Serbian
Government are preoccupied with their political fights and exchanges, after which little space is left for the problems of the more remote areas of the
country.
In addition to this, we should not neglect the fear of all Albanians uniting – a fear that is exacerbated by maps of "Greater Albania all the way to Nis" that
circulate from time to time in the public domestically and internationally. Actually, the Albanian population that constitutes a majority in the Preševo valley has
hoped for separation from Belgrade for a long time. In 1992 already, an unofficial referendum was held. At that event, ninety-five percent of the participants
voted for uniting with Kosovo. In the event that the exchange of territories happens, local Albanians hope that the Preševo valley will be merged with Kosovo,
while the northern areas of Kosovo will be united with central Serbia. Many members of the Albanian movement believe that it is time for the second phase –
namely, for the uniting of all Albanians. i.e., Kosovo independence, which is certain in 2005 according to their belief, will create all the necessary
preconditions for a single state uniting all Albanians. Every mention of a possible division of Kosovo along ethnic lines increases excitement and activates
extremists on both sides, Albanian and Serbian.
It is apparent that Belgrade does not have enough information about the pan-Albanian movement, not to mention that it cannot affect the activities of the
movement in South Serbia, Kosovo and western parts of Macedonia. What makes it even more difficult is the fact that this movement has support in Albania
and in some political, intelligence and other circles out of the Balkan region. In order to prevent the demands of this movement, Serbia should have a clear
state policy and ability to coordinate the activities of its own security forces. However, the reality is the opposite as confirmed by numerous examples of risky
moves by some representatives of the Government of Serbia at the beginning of December 2004. Being himself against the withdrawal of military forces out
of this area, Nebojsa Čović made statements like "the Homeland is tied to the belts of Serbian soldiers" and that "all the Serbs from Kosovo Pomoravlje will
leave the region if the military moves out." Slobodan Samardžić, advisor to Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, made statements that fed the delusions about
Serbia being able, using the escalation of Albanian extremism and potential conflict in Kosovo, to conduct a military and police intervention there and to split
the Kosovo territory. The behaviour of Belgrade authorities regarding the power outages in Kosovo, meaning calls to Serbs not to pay for electricity, as well
as calling for public protests and for blocking the roads in December 2004, led many people to conclude that certain circles in Belgrade took part in
provoking Albanian extremists in Kosovo. Unusual activities in promoting the book Kosovo by Dobrica Cosic, in which a division along ethnic lines is
promoted, gave its contribution to the aforementioned impressions.
Belgrade’s ability to resolve the problems in South Serbia is also constrained by the lack of full cooperation with the international community, especially with
NATO. Belgrade’s position is especially worsened because of insufficient cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in
The Hague. If it were not the case, it would be possible to expect that the international community, i.e., NATO, would help Belgrade to, for example, prevent
the activities of Albanian paramilitary forces from South Serbia in Kosovo and western parts of Macedonia, and vice versa. Independent of this, it should be
stressed that the lack of clear messages and decisive actions from the international community feeds the suspicion that some military, security and
intelligence structures within NATO use the most extreme Albanians as their weapon for destabilization of the situation in this region. One of the reasons for
this may stem from NATO’s estimate that Belgrade, even now, threatens the completion of NATO’s interests. Another fact that points to this is that from
November until the end of December 2004, a few hundred armed Albanian extremists were moving between Kosovo, South Serbia and Macedonia looking
for a reason for combat, while the governments of Serbia and Macedonia, as well as KFOR, UNMIK and Kosovo police did not undertake any serious
measures to apprehend them.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the current situation in this part of Serbia is more than tense. Consequently, it is very important how the Government of
Serbia will react. This is even more so as it is expected that a continued and even intensified political and very entrenched fight will be continued, with each
side trying to accomplish as much as possible. The Albanian side is currently trying to discredit negotiators from Belgrade, mostly Čović, in an attempt to
accomplish already in this phase its demands for international participants to be included at least as facilitators of the negotiations. While doing this,
Albanians are trying to have such facilitators from the pool of people linked to NATO structures or connected to Washington directly. On the other hand,
Belgrade is trying to weaken the Albanian position and to conduct the negotiations through existing institutions, such as the Coordination Body. And while
Albanian local authorities demand that Belgrade allow deployment of international forces in South Serbia, to withdraw its military and police, and to open new
border crossings with Kosovo and Macedonia, Belgrade responds by suggesting the reconstruction of the Coordination Body and with offers to establish a
multi-ethnic committee to investigate Hajrulah’s death and to create a minority national council. The Albanians rejected this offer as "ridiculous" and
reminded Belgrade that its promises for reconstruction of the Coordination Body were not fulfilled over the previous two years. As a matter of fact, because
local Albanians were not included, the Coordination Body has not been a representative instrument that can control the situation in South Serbia since 2003.
The key demand by Albanians is "demilitarization", i.e., withdrawal of Serbian security forces. This illustrates that the Albanian movement is focused on a
delicate security question, which includes the presence of the Serbia-Montenegro military in this area. Judging by the revival of this request, Albanians, i.e.,
the municipal government of Preševo, are trying to push the political situation back to March 2001. Namely, in March 2001, these demands were articulated
by a group of Albanian extremists, who were members of the armed "Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja". On the other end, there was
the so called "Albanian Platform PDP", led by Riza Haljimi, which was a bit more moderate. However, this demand became a general Albanian stance, which
was entered into the "Declaration on Demilitarization" on May 21st, 2001.
These demands were rejected by Belgrade (the same way as in 2001), among other reasons also because they are extreme. However, the support for these
demands comes from the fact that the crisis resolution process in South Serbia was halted at the end of 2003. It should be added here that during 2004 there
were no significant activities of Vojislav Koštunica’s government and its Coordination Body. One reason for this interruption was the then current political
disagreement between Koštunica and Čović and the unsuccessful attempts of the Government of Serbia to establish a different, more efficient state
structure for crisis management in this part of Serbia. Especially noticeable was the teetering of the Serbian Government when considering the ways and the
degree of the involvement of Albanians in local governmental bodies. For example, the local election, despite the agreement, was delayed for almost a year
and an extraordinary election was called at the end of 2002. This delay, in addition to other things, caused the weakening of the influence of Riza Haljimi’s
wing. Since then, his PDP has lost its majority in the municipal parliaments of Preševo and Bujanovac, although Haljimi was elected to be the mayor of
Preševo. Thanks to this, the armed extremists from 2001 took over the local government in the year 2002. At the same time, the PDP was accused of not
Preševo. Thanks to this, the armed extremists from 2001 took over the local government in the year 2002. At the same time, the PDP was accused of not
being able to solve social and economic problems. It was also accused that, even though it played a significant role in peace negotiations between Belgrade
and the international community in 2001, it had failed to protect the interests of Albanians. The extremists’ accusations against the PDP were further
supported by the delay in the implementing of the Serbian Government’s Plan (the so-called Čović Plan from 2001) for the resolution of the crisis in South
Serbia. At the time, this Plan was a good example of the political, security, economic and social reaction to the crisis. However, it lost steam when it reached
its third phase – the institution building phase. In addition, the Parliament of Serbia has not received the report on the Plan’s implementation until now, even
though the deadline for the plan’s implementation expired in 2004. Furthermore, the said plan has not been amended even though the situation changed
noticeably. Therefore, revived and expanded demands by Albanians can become productive if uncoordinated reactions and steps by the Government in
Belgrade are continued. Its lack of unified political stance extends to the adequate reaction time of the Serbian Government to new security provocations,
while giving enough time to Albanians to acquire support for their requirements from the international public, as well as from some NATO structures.
For Belgrade to be able to manage this crisis effectively, it is necessary to settle first the political conflict within the political leadership of Serbia. It is
necessary, then, for the government in Belgrade to publish, as soon as possible, the results of the investigation into the death of the young Albanian. The
condition for this is that the investigation will be carried out professionally and without mystifications that are common in Serbia. In other words, it is
necessary that Serbian authorities act wisely and politically before the fire breaks out (again). In order to pre-empt Albanian extremists, they should take the
initiative to internationalize, for example, the problem and through their own initiative, include the OSCE in calming down the situation in South Serbia.
Compared with the crisis in South Serbia in 2001, it is noticeable that the international organizations are less engaged than they were then. This is especially
true for the OSCE, whose responsibility is the strengthening of political institutions and ensuring Albanian participation in elections; however, it is known that
Albanians from South Serbia have boycotted all the presidential, as well as the state elections since 2000. The OSCE’s engagement was insufficient in
including Albanians in the judicial system. The government of Serbia on its end contributes to this situation by believing that it can resolve the problems on
its own, that it can use the latest crisis to include Albanians into the Coordination Centre and to apply the State Union’s law on minorities, i.e., to create a
national council for them. The impression is that Belgrade acts as if it has ample time available. However, there is no such time left considering the quite
evident escalation of tensions, even violence, in nearby Kosovo. It would be very important for Belgrade, and also for the stability of the region, to conclude
the political negotiations in South Serbia within a month.
Namely, since Albanians don’t want to accept the proposals of Serbian authorities, Belgrade should initiate on its own cooperation with the international
community. It would be possible, in such an arrangement, before anything else, to demand that the OSCE mission in Serbia-Montenegro become involved in
resolving the problems of political participation of Albanians in state institutions and in the political life of Serbia. Also, closer cooperation (according to the
model implemented in resolving the armed conflict in 2001) between the Serbian Government and NATO, i.e., KFOR, in consultations and exchange of
information. The impression is that Belgrade’s position, if it further delays doing this, will be even less favourable not only in South Serbia but it will also
decrease the chances for any participation in managing and resolving the Kosovo crisis.
Considering that it is evident that the crisis in South Serbia will continue and that possible new armed provocations are not excluded, it is necessary that the
authorities in Serbia undertake, as soon as possible, additional measures for establishing trust: strengthening the multi-ethnic police, reforming of local
media, inclusion of Albanian representatives (also, in the Coordination Body), raising the level of citizen initiatives, and realizing the plans for socio-economic
revival of the local communities and improvement of the economic status of the population in this region.
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